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ABSTRACT
The following article exposes how was the 
formation process of legal indigenism in 
Peru. Shows several issues in indigenous 
consultation process and recognition of 
territorialities. Approaches the indigenous 
self-determination rights and the conse-
quences of colonial and capitalism about 
on this subject.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009 the town of Bagua was 
the scene of one of the most relevant 
political events in recent Peruvian history. 
Amazonian indigenous people blocked 
the Curva del Diablo highway for two 
months protesting against a governmental 
package of decrees approved by 
President García, which favoured the 
exploitation of natural resources in the 
Amazon. As a consequence of public re-
pressionhundreds of people were wound-
ed and thirty-three people died. 
After this political event known as the 
Baguazo, in Peru emerged a social con-
sensus about the necessity of intercultural 
policies, directed not just to ‘include’ in-
digenous peoples but to recognise and 
value their different culture and, in this 
way, to reduce social confl icts (Sevillano, 
2010). A Consultation Law was the legal 
mechanism thought to achieve these aims, 
a norm based on the ILO Convention 169 
to consult indigenous peoples before ap-
proving any administrative or legal norm 
that can affect their collective rights.  
The Consultation Law (Law N° 29785, 
September 2011) is the fi rst of this kind in 
Latin America; it was welcomed by politi-
cians, international organisations, civil so-
ciety organisations and even the business 
sector. This was the beginning of a new 
wave of legal indigenism given the atten-
tion and importance of the Consultation 
Law and indigenous legal and institutional 
devices recently approved. 
I identify three waves of legal indigenism 
in Peru. The fi rst wave was inaugurated 
by the legal recognition of “indigenous 
communities” in the Peruvian Constitution 
of 1920 and the reforms of President 
Leguia (1923– 1927 and 1927–1930). 
However, radical demands of rural indig-
enous uprisings were rapidly assimilated 
by the modernising discourse of President 
Leguía, who implemented superfi cial and 
conservative reforms (Grijalva, 2010; 
Wise, 1983; Varese, 1978). Indeed, 
Leguia’s discourse (‘to incorporate the 
Indian to national society’) was very racist 
at its basis because the Indian – in the 
process of incorporation – had to be edu-
cated and civilised (Urrutia, 1992).
The second wave of legal indigenism was 
inaugurated by President Velasco (1968 
– 1975). Velasco enacted the 1969 
Agrarian Reform Law and created the 
‘peasant community’ and in 1974 passed 
Law 20653 creating the ‘native commu-
nity’ for the Amazonian region. The peas-
ant and native communities land were 
strongly protected, however, the aim of 
recognising natives and peasant commu-
nities was not to repair indigenous from 
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historical plunder and oppression but to 
integrate these people into Peruvian so-
ciety to widen the government popular 
basis (Surrallés, 2009), and to establish 
state capitalism, modernisation, and na-
tional integration, at the same time of 
minimising peasants and workers upris-
ings (Seligmann, 1993). Furthermore, 
Native Law was a mean to assure in-
ternal colonisation because after titling 
communities, huge extension of land re-
mained without ‘owners’ (land that tru-
ly constituted indigenous territory), fa-
vouring land taking by foreign people. 
That is why from the beginning many 
called the process of titling as an ‘insti-
tutionalised dispossession’ (Barclay and 
Santos Granero, 1980: 43-74; Chirif, 
1980: 15-24; Espinosa, 2010: 245). 
The Consultation Law inaugurated the 
third wave of legal indigenism in Peru. 
The aim of this paper is to show the dark 
side of the Consultation Law and how it is 
still embedded in coloniality.
2. Critiques on the Prior Consultation Law
The original optimism about the Prior 
Consultation Lawwas quickly abandoned. 
Its process of implementation – that had 
as fi rst outcome its regulation (Reglamento 
of the Law Nº 29785 of April 2012) -, 
was strongly criticized because it estab-
lished rules that would make superfl uous 
the advancements obtained by the Law.
It is true that the regulation has many 
defects, but even the Law had polemical 
solutions: fi rst of all, it does not recognize 
comprehensively ‘the right of consent’ (as 
in theUnited Nations Declaration of the 
Right of Indigenous Peoples of 2007), and 
it does establish a restrictive defi nition of 
the category of ‘indigenous’ (more limit-
ed than the Convention 169). With these 
premises, the regulation just deepened 
the problems. The main criticisms are: 
• There is a continuous emphasis of the 
necessity of ‘direct affectation’ of indige-
nous collective rights as a requirement to 
undertake consultation, what can be used 
to limit indigenous peoples’ rights by as-
serting that the affectation of those rights 
is just ‘indirect’. The Declaration does not 
mention the necessity of ‘direct affecta-
tion’ and the Convention does not have 
that emphasis. 
• There are very polemical cases of ex-
oneration of consultation processes, such 
as the construction and maintenance of in-
frastructure to provide health, education 
and in general ‘public services’ (15 Final 
Disposition of the Regulation). This norm is 
very dangerous because it can exonerate 
from consultation any development proj-
ect that usually produces major impacts 
on the indigenous population.
• There is not a proper regulation of the right 
to consent. The regulation only recognises 
two cases in which the consent of the indig-
enous peoples is necessary (7 Final disposi-
tion): when the state seeks to displace them 
to other territories (according to Convention 
169), and when dangerous materials are 
attempted to be kept in indigenous land 
(according to the Declaration). The necessi-
ty of consent in projects that would produce 
‘major impacts on large part of the territo-
ry’ established by the Inter- American Court 
of Human Rights in the Case Saramaka is 
not included.
• The Second Final Disposition established 
that all legal and administrative measures 
previously enacted without a consultation 
process, maintain their validity. For many ac-
tivists, the measures approved after 1995 
(date in which Convention 169 entered into 
force), should be reviewed and consulted.
These critiques are common among NGOs; 
indeed, instead of the academia, the mas-
sive intellectual production on Consultation 
Law is developed by NGOs, who are 
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worried in generating social impacts rath-
er than deeply refl ecting on fundamental 
questions. The problem is that the analysis 
used to be limited to a description of what 
has been established by the Convention 
169 and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, without observing the roots 
of indigenous rights and its relation to co-
loniality. In fact, International Law is con-
stantly re-constructed by struggles for 
rights’ recognition, so it is more important 
to analyse critically the social tendencies, 
the discourses and the emancipatory po-
tentials of human rights than describing 
what the current state of affairs is.
For example, a high functionary of 
Afrodita mine in Northern Amazon argues 
that Afrodita obtained mining concessions 
in 1993, before Convention 169 was rati-
fi ed by the Peruvian state; therefore, con-
sultation was not a requirement for mining 
activities in this very sensible ecological 
area (Company representative interview, 
21-05-13). Although legal activists (Ruiz, 
2012) have promoted audacious legal in-
terpretations to address this issue, from a 
legalistic view, indeed, there would not be 
a right of consultation in this case. From a 
broader perspective on the tendencies of 
International Law and Human Rights, the 
right to self-determination cannot be ig-
nored and recognised just with a legisla-
tive act. It is an inherent right of a people.
Thus, it is a mistake to focus on consulta-
tion as a key element of indigenous legal-
ity and its political agenda. Even more, 
a profound analysis on Consultation Law 
and its regulation would lead us to ques-
tion its very rationality. Let’s start by ob-
serving the structure of the consultation 
process. It is a process of ‘dialogue’ be-
tween the state and the peoples (with no 
intervention of companies); it is led by 
the public entity that enacted a Law or 
administrative norm (including licenses for 
extractive activities) that would affect in-
digenous collective rights. Then, the pro-
cess may have 6 stages (arts. 14 – 23 of 
the Regulation): identifi cation (of the peo-
ple affected and the norm enacted); pub-
licity (of the norm); information (the state 
inform about the measure to indigenous 
peoples); internal evaluation (the commu-
nity will evaluate the convenience of the 
measure); intercultural dialogue (which 
emerges only if there is not agreement 
after the internal evaluation); and deci-
sion (in case of not agreement the fi nal 
decision is made by the state). This pro-
cess has a very short duration: 120 days.
As can be observed, the whole process is 
designed as a mechanism to inform and 
convince indigenous peoples of a decision 
already made by the state; the ‘intercul-
tural dialogue’ just appears if indigenous 
peoples are no persuaded. But should 
not be the other way around? An inter-
cultural dialogue should be the fi rst stage 
in a state really respectful of indigenous 
peoples, in order to identify the priorities 
of indigenous populations regarding their 
needs and aspirations and undertake a 
dialogue mutually enriching.  
This rationale is rooted in the colonial 
character of Western legality and the 
capitalist economy. Capitalist expansion 
needs the elimination of any barrier to 
investment, and social confl ict is a barrier. 
The hope of some private actors (within 
and outside the state) was to institution-
alise the confl icts within the Consultation 
Law, and through this process – of passing 
information and persuasion – legitimise 
the policy: “If properly obtained previ-
ous consent should allow large extractive 
industry projects to go forward in a less 
confl icted atmosphere” (Laplante and 
Spears, 2008: p. 71). In sum, the law and 
its regulation is aimed at freezing indige-
nous politics into new extractivist policies. 
In addition, the expectations and propa-
ganda raised by the Consultation Law 
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make us forget other important rights that 
have been historically part of indigenous 
peoples’ agenda, such as territoriality. 
As the activist Diego Garcia (Activist inter-
view, 12-06-13) asserts, nobody is think-
ing of consultation as an act of self-deter-
mination or even as a proper indigenous 
right, but as a means of not addressing 
serious issues. 
3. Prior to Prior Consultation: territoriality 
vs. coloniality
According to Salmón (2013), currently, 
indigenous communities not only demand 
free, prior, and informed consultation, but 
also claim the recognition of territoriali-
ties and informed consent. This affi rmation 
is incorrect because the struggle for ter-
ritorialities and consent is not a ‘current’ 
claim, but a historical one. The academia 
and activists tend to conceptualise indig-
enous rights around the right of consul-
tation, so other rights are just emerging 
rights that someday would be recognised 
by the Law.
In fact, territorial rights and prior consent 
are connected to their self-determination, 
the original indigenous right. Indigenous 
peopleshave lived in autonomy before 
colonisation. The indigenous legality 
(each one with their particularities) rec-
ognised territorial rights for indigenous 
nations, collective and individual land use 
rights, and a whole system of rights and 
duties that were attempted to destroy or 
invisibilise by Western legality. In the pro-
cess, different peoples have maintained 
different degrees of autonomy, from 
peoples in voluntary isolation to peoples 
in process of complete assimilation to the 
Western logic. However, those peoples 
that have maintained their legal frame-
work and their idiosyncrasy as ‘peoples’ 
still struggle for the maintenance of their 
foundational rights. 
Therefore, self-determination is a princi-
ple and right for indigenous peoples, but 
is not just a cultural, fundamental or human 
right (all of them elaborated in Western 
terms as constitutional rights) but a foun-
dational right in the sense that it is the basis 
of a whole legal, political and economic 
system rooted in non-Western ontologies 
and epistemologies. That is why I conceive 
this right as the ‘right to have communal 
rights’ beyond Western thinking (Merino, 
2013). Self-determination and territorial-
ity as foundational rights support the right 
of consent, the right to use and obtain di-
rect benefi ts from the land among others 
rights that contrast with new indigenous 
rights recognised in the last decades by 
international standards. 
Indeed, many of these new rights respond 
to Western logics: the right of consultation 
(arts. 6 .1; 6.2; 15.2 of Convention 169), 
for example, has as premise that a state 
is going to affect indigenous self-deter-
mination and it needs at least to ask in-
digenous peoples their opinion; the right 
of indigenous peoples to participate in 
economic benefi ts obtained by extractive 
industries (art. 15.2 of Convention 169) 
respond to the fact that companies are 
exploiting (or are going to exploit) indig-
enous land and resources.
It does not mean that there is not certain 
recognition of foundational rights at inter-
national level (indeed, in an ambiguous 
way, the Convention 169 recognizes the 
right to territory and the Declaration the 
right of self-determination); or that many 
indigenous peoples, because of their his-
torical process, are closer to the discourse 
and practice of the new rights (such as 
consultation and economic benefi ts); but 
that the problem of coloniality is still alive 
and hidden behind an optimistic discourse 
of indigenous rights’ globalization. 
This situation generates practical conse-
quences. After the regulation of Consul-
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tation Law, the government had to decide 
which would be the fi rst process of con-
sultation. The communities of the Quich-
ua of Pastaza were elected as the fi rst 
communities to be consulted because they 
had suffered during decades from envi-
ronmental impacts and the media recently 
had showed their situation. The consulta-
tion was planned to the commencement of 
exploitation activities of the oil concession 
1AB located close to the communities. The 
Quichua of Pastaza, however, argued 
that before any process of consultation 
they wanted the recognition of their ter-
ritorial rights and the remediation of 60 
years of environmental impacts on their 
territory. The government had to, fi rstly, 
delay de process of consultation, and 
then renounce to implement the process.
This example shows how new rights such 
as ‘consultation’ are confronted with foun-
dational rights, such as territoriality. 
The problem of focusing on consultation is 
that it can invisibilise foundational rights 
that are components of today’s indige-
nous agenda. AIDESEP and the Institute 
of the Common Good (Instituto del Bien 
Comun – IBC), for example, are promot-
ing the notion of ‘integral territory’.
One of the experts of the IBC is an Awajun 
who has developed technically and the-
oretically this concept. According to him 
(Indigenous interview, 04-04-2013), the 
problem is that native communities titling 
covers small parcels in which they live (as 
in the Andes) without taking into account 
the whole territory that includes spaces 
for fi shing, hunting and collection. Then, 
huge areas become ‘free spaces’ that are 
given for extractive activities without the 
necessity of consultation. To face this prob-
lem, communities claim the extension of 
their titled land or they try to create new 
communities, but both of them are very 
bureaucratic processes. This problem can 
be overcome by titling peoples territorial 
habitats instead of specifi c plots. National 
and international legal standards do not 
completely protect indigenous ‘territories’, 
but somehow they allow the elaboration 
of legal arguments in its favour. For ex-
ample, the Law of native communities 
(article 10), establishes that areas used 
sporadically for hunting, fi shing, collection 
can be marked and titled; Article 13 of 
Convention 169 establishes that the term 
‘land’ refers also to indigenous territories, 
and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has established that is an obliga-
tion of the state the titling of ‘collective 
property’ (Awas Tingni vs. Nicaragua).  
However, territorial rights and ‘collective 
property’ remains contentious and ambig-
uous concepts at the international level. The 
key concept of territory has specifi c features 
that make it different from property, how-
ever, whereas liberal legality tries to assim-
ilate the concept into its logic; Amazonian 
indigenous peoples are demarking their 
territory in a long term strategy until its 
comprehensive legal recognition.
4. The right of self-determination, the 
national interest and the appropriation 
of liberal legality
To consider ‘consultation’ a mechanism 
of guarantying the exercise of the right 
of self-determination of indigenous peo-
ples (Sevillano, 2010) is mistaken. As the 
International Andean Coordination of 
Indigenous Organisations – CAOI  ex-
plains, without recognising the right to 
consent, consultation can be reduced to a 
simple procedure directed to legitimate 
the imposition of norms, programs and 
projects that negatively impact on indige-
nous peoples’ rights (CAOI, 2012).
Thus, one consequence of the right and 
principle of self-determination is the right 
to consent, wrongly called ‘right to veto’ 
because it does not derive from a spe-
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cial power conferred to indigenous peo-
ples due to their hegemonic position in the 
democratic system (as is the case in pres-
idential veto power), but it is expression 
of their self-determination as peoples. 
The problem is that no state wants to rec-
ognize self-determination for indigenous 
peoples because of the alleged possibili-
ty of secession. 
But in reality what most indigenous peo-
ples claim with self-determination is the 
respect of their vital spaces instead of the 
creation of new states. The anthropologist 
Richard Smith (2003) has accompanied 
indigenous movements for decades and 
has found that self-determination refers 
the right of a people to choose the type 
of relation it wants to maintain with a 
dominant state. There are of course some 
exceptions such as the radical proposals 
of the American Indian and scholar Ward 
Churchill (2002), who claim for the con-
stitution of an Indian nation independent 
from the U.S. However, most academic and 
political proposals range from some de-
gree of autonomy through decentraliza-
tion within a dominant nation such as the 
liberal multiculturalism in Latin America, 
to political projects that recognize Indian 
nations within the state, such as a Federal 
state in the Tully’s proposal (1995) or the 
Plurinational state of Bolivia.
Then, to exert the right of self-determi-
nation does not mean secession, but an 
adequate relation between indigenous 
peoples and the state. In Peru, self-deter-
mination is legally recognized within the 
context of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism 
in Peru is equivalent to pluri-culturalism or 
the respect of the cultural plurality. Thus, 
Article 2.19 of the Constitution recogniz-
es the ‘ethnic and cultural plurality’ of the 
country and the right of each person to 
maintain their ethnic identity. 
Article 89 and 149 of the Constitution rec-
ognizes self-determination as the auton-
omy of peasant and native communities 
(what involve the right of autonomic or-
ganization, communal work, use and free 
disposition of land, economic, administra-
tive and jurisdictional autonomy within the 
‘Law’). Nonetheless, as this autonomy does 
not mean that indigenous peoples hold a 
complete power of decision on their land 
(and they have not right on the resources 
of the subsoil), their claims often go toward 
decolonial projects. A decolonial project, 
as in the case of Bolivia, would mean the 
recognition of indigenous peoples not as 
‘communities’ but as ‘nations’ and the rec-
ognition of their vital spaces not just as 
‘land rights’ but as ‘territorial rights’. 
However, even in decolonial projects or 
any other project in which there is a dom-
inant state, the principle of self-determi-
nation is affected by norms of exception 
and national interest. The application of 
these norms has always been connected 
to the expansion of extractive industries. 
Indeed, as Orihuela asserts (2012), the 
rise of modern extractive industries is 
connected to indigenous exploitation and 
dispossession, in the mines of the Andes 
or the rubber plantations of the Amazon. 
Then, it was natural that in post-colonial 
nations, land rights were not well defi ned 
Independent nations   Radical Indian projects (Ward  Churchill)
Plurinational State   Decolonial project (Bolivian constitution)
Federal States    Postcolonial/liberal project (James Tully)
Administrative autonomy  Multicultural project (Most constitutions in LA)
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and the state owned all underground re-
sources: this allows the legal displacement 
of communities in the name of the greater 
public good. 
The state, thus, by exception can exploit 
resources in protected areas created for 
its environmental fragility (Law 26834, 
Art. 21 b., 1997), and even in reserves 
for indigenous peoples in voluntary iso-
lation (Law 28736, Art. 5 c., 2006) be-
cause the untouchable character of the 
reserves might be broken by the state on 
behalf of the public interest (Finer et al, 
2008; Hughes, 2010). Thus, by designing 
policies from the logic of coloniality, the 
government completely control peoples’ 
vital spaces and the reduction or violation 
of indigenous rights is a necessary sac-
rifi ce given the promise of development 
(Stetson, 2012).
This power on indigenous peoples is usual-
ly justifi ed as an expression of state sov-
ereignty (the argument that indigenous 
peoples cannot have a ‘veto power’ over 
the state) or the necessity of economic de-
velopment and the fulfi lment of the gov-
ernment social responsibilities (Laplante 
and Spears, 2008). 
However, there is a historical connection 
between the political economy of ex-
traction and the power to exploit indige-
nous territories on behalf of national inter-
est. This connection expresses the logic of 
coloniality by which certain peoples can 
be exceptionally sacrifi ced on the ground 
of the alleged economic benefi ts for all 
(economic argument) and the national co-
hesion (sovereign argument). But what is 
obscured is that the people scarifi ed usu-
ally have been ranked as the less civilised 
and constructed as those who urgently 
needs be integrated into modernisation. 
It is also obscured that these people are 
often those who have suffered most of 
environmental disasters and have nev-
er enjoyed real state public services. As 
they usually say, “the state only reaches 
us when it wants to exploit our territory”.
Indeed, the sovereign argument is very 
problematic because it is rooted in the 
colonial denial of indigenous founda-
tional rights: all the consequences of this 
‘national cohesion’ when territorial rights 
are at stake, entail the exclusion of indi-
geneity.  The economic argument is also 
problematic. The scholar and activist 
Eduardo Gudynas asserts (Activist inter-
view, 26-10-13) that the argument about 
the necessity of extractivism for support-
ing social programs and development 
goals is fl awed because in the majority of 
cases there is not a correlation between 
revenues from extractivist industries and 
specifi c social achievements, and govern-
ments spent a lot of money in subsidize 
extractivism and manage its social and 
environmental impacts. 
In this context, the discursive use of the term 
self-determination is not guarantee of the 
respect of indigenous rights. In a recent 
case (Tres Islas, 2012), the Constitutional 
Tribunal recognised the right of self-de-
termination of a community against ille-
gal logging, but: Would it be the same 
if self-determination would have been 
opposed to development state projects or 
extractive activities? Apart from that de-
cision, the Constitutional Tribunal indeed 
has been very conservative when decid-
ing about indigenous rights (Ruiz, 2011).
But the Law is still useful. Activists assert 
that they supported the approbation of 
Consultation Law because of the political 
opportunity. Indigenous peoples know 
about the limitations of the Consultation 
Law, they are very critical of it but at the 
same time they demand the government 
to respect the Law by implementing more 
consultation processes (Indigenous inter-
view, 26-04-13). Thus, in the same way 
with titling procedures and international 
human rights, indigenous peoples appro-
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priate strategically the Consultation Law 
to express their political claims. Liberal 
legality becomes a medium to express 
their indigeneity. 
In sum, there is a similar rationale in the dif-
ferent waves of legal indigenism: recognition 
of rights according to Western parameters; 
norms of exception to impose the capitalist 
logic; and the indigenous response through 
the appropriation and use of the legality.
Thus, the main challenge of Consultation 
Law is still coloniality, or the colonial logic on 
which liberal legality is embedded. 
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